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Interview of John Davis by Jonathan Wight 
 
 
John B. Davis is Professor of Economics, Marquette University, and 
Professor of Economics, University of Amsterdam, is author of Keynes’s 
Philosophical Development (Cambridge, 1994), The Theory of the Individual 
in Economics (Routledge, 2003), Individuals and Identity in Economics 
(Cambridge, 2011), and co-author with Marcel Boumans of Economic 
Methodology: Understanding Economics as a Science (Palgrave, 2010).  He 
has been a visiting professor at the Sorbonne, Cambridge University, Erasmus 
University, and Duke University.  He is a former editor of the Review of 
Social Economy, and is currently co-editor of the Journal of Economic 
Methodology and the Routledge book series Advances in Social 
Economics.  He is a past president or chair of the History of Economics   
Society, the International Network for Economic Method, the Association for Social Economics, and past 
vice-president of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought.  He is a Tinbergen Institute 
Fellow, and has taught two dozen different courses. 
 
 
How did you get interested in social 
economics and who were your mentors? 
 
I studied philosophy and ethics before 
economics, and when I turned to economics this 
implied to me that the economy is embedded in 
society rather than an autonomous realm.  So not 
only is society the more encompassing frame, 
and economic life only part of social life, but 
because values are pervasive in social life, it 
follows that values are pervasive in economic 
life – not just market values but ethical values 
and social values of many kinds.  These two 
principles – social embeddedness and value 
pervasiveness – are central to social economics, 
and the richness of the social economics 
research program is associated with the many 
ways they can be investigated.  They are also 
deep assumptions often not made explicit, and 
so many non-standard economists who may not 
self-identify themselves as social economists 
share a social economic view of the world.  This 
means mentors can come from many 
backgrounds.  In my economics program at 
Michigan State University, John P. Henderson 
and Warren J. Samuels were my mentors.  
Henderson was a specialist on Ricardo and 
Samuels was an institutionalist, but both 
strongly supported the ASE.  When I arrived at 
Marquette University to edit the Review of 
Social Economy, Peter Danner and Bill Waters, 
the previous editor, mentored me.  They were 
Catholic social economists, though I was not.  
So again the social economic influences on me 
were indirect and not easy to explain.  I think 
this kind of experience is true of many people 
who see themselves as social economists or as 
sharing a social economic view of the world.  
But because the community is so diverse and 
broadly defined it seems less visible than other 
non-standard research programs.  Practically 
speaking this has meant that the history of the 
ASE has been very much a matter of particular 
people welcoming and mentoring people who 
themselves find they have a broad social 
economic view of the world.  For example, it has 
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long been part of the mission of the Review of 
Social Economy to support young scholars. 
    
What obstacles did you encounter 
professionally (and/or personally) in 
countering the standard economic model? 
  
The greatest single obstacle is the profession’s 
blind scientific positivism and denial that values 
underlie economic reasoning and operate 
throughout economic life.  It’s a remarkable 
historical (and cultural?) conundrum that skilled, 
intelligent standard economists can be so naïve 
and wrong on this subject.  I have speculated 
recently on why this is the case (“Economists 
Odd Stand on the Positive-Normative 
Distinction: A Behavioral Economics View” – 
on SSRN), but it may be that one has to think 
more about the kind of society we live in to 
really explain this.  In any case, to talk about 
economics being value-laden is the fastest way 
to alienate mainstream colleagues.  That makes 
it hard to be a social economist or to do research 
with this conviction since one can’t really 
identify one’s perspective and expect a 
sympathetic reception.  Rather to engage one’s 
colleagues one needs to appear sympathetic to 
their positivism, not just the value neutrality idea 
but also much casual empiricism that says the 
fact speak for themselves (with a little help from 
econometrics).  It also doesn’t help that the 
profession seems to becoming more applied and 
a-theoretical.  This might be a symptom of 
increased doubts about the mainstream 
neoclassical paradigm, especially as an effect of 
the rise of behavioral economics, but as of yet 
this seems to involve very little reflection on the 
methodological foundations of economics.     
 
As for the standard economic model itself, in my 
view things have improved in economics over 
the last two decades.  There is now much more 
diversity of opinion on what rationality is and I 
expect this to increase.  The general argument I 
have made in this regard (as in my 2008 
Cambridge Journal of Economics paper on 
recent economics) is that all the new approaches 
in economics not only draw significantly from 
other sciences but as a result deliver critiques of 
some of the most basic commitments of standard 
economics.  How this plays out in the future, and 
also what the impact might be of social 
disapproval of the economics profession since 
the financial crisis on the direction of economics 
are yet to be seen. But we now have many 
competing camps in economics, not quite a 
professional pluralism but a kind of ad hoc 
increasingly pluralistic research platform 
(especially for younger age individuals).  So I 
think it is an exciting time to be in economics, 
unlike my earlier years in economics when it 
was monolithically neoclassical.  In my view 
this is also manifest in an increased vitality in 
social economics research.  From a social 
economics perspective, consider that the fact 
there is now considerable behavioral and 
experimental research into social preferences, 
trust, reciprocity, altruism, etc.  It used to be that 
the JEL code A13, Relation of Economics to 
Social Values, fell largely within the domain of 
social economics.  But it is now descriptive of a 
wide range of research from economists who 
typically do not recognize themselves as social 
economists! 
 
What analytical work of yours has made a 
difference to our understanding of the world 
and/or policy?   
 
It’s my view that the central deep assumption of 
standard economics is that individuals are 
atomistic beings.  Standard rationality theory 
presupposes this, and I don’t think one can make 
effective critiques of rationality without showing 
why the standard view of the individual is 
wrong.  My analytical contribution on this score 
has been to develop an identity approach to 
evaluate any individual conception in terms of 
whether it can be said to successfully refer to 
individuals.  My first book on this (The Theory 
of the Individual in Economics) argued that the 
standard neoclassical individual conception fails 
to refer to individuals.  How ironic and telling 
about the theory that it is ultimately not really 
about individuals!  My second book on this 
(Individuals and Identity in Economics) 
critically evaluated other individual conceptions 
in recent economics, and argued that an 
adequate individual conception in economics 
needs to show that individuality is both socially 
endogenous and relatively autonomous.  I 
emphasize the importance of thinking in terms 
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of capabilities, and argue that developing and 
maintaining a personal identity is a special kind 
of capability people may or may not succeed in 
developing.  Many economists, of course, think 
philosophical arguments have only limited value 
for economics, but I believe that this is 
mistaken, and that good economic theories need 
to be built around realistic and adequate 
concepts.   
 
It is not easy to say what difference to our 
understanding of the world and/or policy a set of 
philosophical arguments might make.  But I 
think two things can be said about the issue of 
the individual concept in economics.  First, this 
concept has been central to the history of social 
economics – that is, a more enlightened version 
of what the person is – and it is arguably the 
basis for the main value that many social 
economists believe to be distinctive of social 
economics and what unifies its policy vision, 
namely, human dignity.  Why do we care about 
inequality?  Because it violates justice.  What 
does justice require?  That every person be able 
to live a life of dignity which they respect.  
Second, when one thinks about economics and 
policy, and asks oneself what the ultimate 
motivators are behind all policy 
recommendation, one risks irrelevance if one 
overlooks how modern history has made the idea 
of democracy an ambition of all societies and 
people everywhere.  Democracy is seen to be a 
type of social organization most likely to secure 
the well-being of individuals.  So how we think 
about individuals anchors all our thinking about 
policy.  Economic policy depends on 
economists’ explanation of individual behavior 
in markets.  Thus rebuilding economics around 
an adequate conception of the individual may 
allow us to reformulate economic policy in ways 
consistent with democratic social values.  I think 
this is fundamental to a social economic vision 
of the world, and where I hope my analytical 
work makes some contribution. 
 
What do you think are the most promising 
areas of social economics today?  What advice 
would you give to graduate students setting 
out to study social economics? 
 
I’m not sure what the most promising areas are, 
but there are three areas related to my own 
interests that might be valuable social economic 
research topics.  First, social capital theory is 
interesting because it examines trust and 
cooperation in social networks, thus combining 
the embeddedness and value pervasiveness 
principles.  The social capital research program 
is well developed outside of economics, but has 
also begun to be an active subject of 
investigation in economics as researchers try to 
understand how social networks underlie 
economic relationships.  The original meaning 
of social economics was the economics of the 
cooperative sector of the economy, different 
from both market and state.  Social capital 
theory is thus classically social economic, and 
economists who share an interest in this sector, 
particularly in connection with their interest in 
how institutions generate trust and cooperation, 
are essentially operating from a social economic 
perspective.   
 
Second, the financial crisis made herding part of 
what needs to be included in the explanation of 
economic behavior.  Herding involves social 
linkages that operate across and outside markets.  
So again market relationships are embedded in 
social relationships.  And as people are now well 
aware, herding can have extremely costly effects 
on how economies function and on people’s 
well-being.  I think this subject is quite under-
researched.  But it is not an easy subject to 
investigate in a systematic way.  Further, its 
investigation can provoke serious 
reconsideration of the role the equilibrium 
concept plays and ought to play in economic 
analysis, and this is also a challenge.  Another 
problem for working on herding is that it might 
be necessary to think more about finance – an 
area social economists give little attention.  But 
altogether I think this is productive ground for 
social economic research. 
 
Third, the concept of identity, on which I have 
worked for many years, still seems to me to be a 
promising subject for economics.  Once one 
abandons the assumption that preferences are 
exogenous, what determines who the individual 
is and the extent to which individual identity is 
endogenous to the world needs to be explained if 
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we are to have a more adequate theory of 
individual action.  I have tried to focus on the 
interrelationship between personal identity and 
social identity, but there seems to be 
considerable interest in the latter concept alone 
for what it adds to explanations of economic 
behavior.  Needless to say, the concept of 
identity is hardly on most economists’ radar 
screens, and so this subject may be an uphill 
research strategy.  Yet it is obvious that 
‘identity’ is an important preoccupation of 
people in the world we live in, so I think the 
subject has important potential for social 
economists. 
 
Let me add two comments on research 
methodology.  In my capacity as an economic 
methodologist (and currently co-editor with 
Wade Hands of Journal of Economic 
Methodology), I think how one explains the 
subjects one investigates is also important to the 
quality of one’s research.  First, then, it seems to 
me that economics research ought to be more 
interdisciplinary, particularly in importing ideas 
and concepts from other social sciences.  This 
often generates new insights and forces people 
to rethink old explanations.  Second, it seems to 
me that more research might use multiple 
methods of analysis to in effect triangulate upon 
desired conclusions.  In this regard, case studies 
and survey research strike me as especially 
valuable when done well (though they are 
maligned by many economists).  They also are a 
way to justify request for funding support, and, 
not to be overlooked, can open up new 
experiential windows on the world for 
researchers. 
 
More generally, my advice to graduate students 
interested in social economics is to pursue 
research you think is socially valuable and of 
interest to you, and work to be successful in the 
economics profession.  There is no simply way 
to achieve the latter, but pursuing it at the 
expense of what motivates you is not a happy 
way to live one’s life.  More often than not in 
my view the two goals are compatible in the 
long run. 
 
Why does social economics matter to the 
world beyond academia? 
 
Social economics matters to the world beyond 
academia because, in contrast to ‘dismal 
science’ economics – how most people see 
economics – it advances a humanistic agenda.  
The scarcity orientation of standard economics 
imposes an efficiency perspective that always 
emphasizes constraints on choice.  You might 
say standard economics is all about constraints; 
what one can’t have.  In contrast, social 
economics basically operates with a human 
flourishing view; it is about what people aspire 
to.  Scarcity, of course, is a real issue at any 
point in time, but when a theory is essentially 
static, scarcity becomes the dominant vision of 
life.  I see this scarcity vision of standard 
economics as an historical artifact.  It is 
probably reflective of societies transitioning out 
of widespread poverty, which used to reflect 
most of the world, but is not reflective of the 
world of relative abundance that lies (hopefully) 
before us.  In this world, human improvement is 
a feasible goal, and that economics is important 
to its realization.  Social economists with their 
human flourishing perspective have this 
alternative vision of the world.   
 
It also matters to the world beyond academia 
whether economists can talk about such matters 
as justice and inequality.  How much confidence 
can people have in a profession that is so 
influential regarding how the work works but 
which finds these subjects essentially peripheral 
to what economics is about?  Social economists 
see subjects such as these as central to the 
subject, and in my view this goes considerable 
distance toward explaining the relevance of a 
social economic approach.  I’ve continually had 
the experience when talking to people outside of 
economics that if I emphasize the normative 
dimensions of economics, they react favorably, 
saying that is exactly what they thought 
economics ought to be concerned with.  Surely 
this is evidence of the real world value of the 
social economic approach. 
   
 
 
